The problem of arising the Pareto inefficient norm in relations “investor – government” type. by Sokolovskyi, Dmytro & Sokolovska, Olena
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The problem of arising the Pareto
inefficient norm in relations “investor –
government” type.
Dmytro Sokolovskyi and Olena Sokolovska
February 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44745/
MPRA Paper No. 44745, posted 5. March 2013 14:16 UTC
 The problem of arising the Pareto inefficient norm in 
relations “investor – government” type 
Dmytro SOKOLOVSKYI
1
, Olena SOKOLOVSKA
2
 
1. Introduction 
The article deals with one of aspects of interaction between investors, operating (or intending 
to operate) in certain country and government of this country. In some detail, this refers to 
making of behavioral decisions by interacting parties concerning the additional financing for 
reduction of risks of investor’s activity: individually – by investors themselves, and in the 
framework of the whole economy – by government. 
The question at issue is (as practice shows) that the norms of interaction between investors 
and government, arising in the processof evolution, occasionally are inefficient, i.e. they are 
Pareto non-optimal. The question now arises of how far such inefficiency is the result of 
coincidence, and how far it is the result of quite rational economic behavior of interacting 
parties? The goal of proposed paper consists in attempt to answer this question by way of 
analytical modeling of interaction between investors and government. 
2. Literature review 
The problem of interaction between investor and government, particularly the problem of 
investor’s decision-making, has been studied in a number of researches. 
W. Tapia & H. Yermo (2007) classified the behavioral economics literature on investment 
choice. According to them, much of the discussion concerning the implementation of 
investment choice assumes that individuals are both exceptionally good decision makers and 
are able to carry out their investment decisions. Behavioral economists, on the other side, 
have shown that in reality several obstacles and behavioral challenges compromise good 
investment decision making i.e. the individuals do not follow the traditional assumptions 
about rational economic decision-making. 
Specifically they’ve separated some behavioral factors, influencing on investment choice. 
Choice and information overload. The increasing number of investment choices often leads to 
failing of investor’s actions. Thus, S. Iyengar& E. Kamenica (2010) find that a larger choice 
sets induce a stronger investor’s preference for simple options. J. Agnew (2002) studied how 
individual characteristics (age, salary, job tenure, gender), influence an investor’s decisions. 
She found that the increasing number of investment alternatives can lead to investor’s 
inefficient choice. 
                                                 
1
Cand.Sc. in Economics, Senior Researcher, Dept. of problems of modeling of economic 
systems, Institute of Industrial Economics of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 
Donetsk.dmy.falko@gmail.com 
2
Cand.Sc. in Economics, Researcher, Dept. of financial and economic problems of industrial 
potential development, Institute of Industrial Economics of National Academy of Sciences of 
Ukraine, Donetsk.elena.lukyanenko@gmail.com 
Unstable and undefined preferences. Much of the research in this area shows that individuals 
often do not arrive at the decision with firm preferences in mind. Rather, individual 
preferences to risk and time, for example, vary depending on the decision to be made. 
Heuristic decision-making which is one of systematic violations of rationality that affect 
investment decision.The decision making process is not a strictly rational one where all 
relevant information is collected and objectively evaluated. Rather, the decision maker takes 
mental «short cuts» (D. Kahneman& A. Tversky (1974)). There may be good practical 
reasons for adopting a heuristic decision making process, particularly when there is time 
pressure, or when other factors make fully evaluating all choices difficult. 
The good evidence of heuristic decision-making is the so called “1/n” investment strategy 
(naïve diversification strategies), i.e. the strategy to split one’s wealth uniformly between the 
available investment possibilities (V. DeMiguel et al. (2009), G. Pflug et al. (2012)). 
D. Dittrich et al. (2005) experimentally tested overconfidence in investment decisions by 
offering participants the possibility to substitute their own for alternative investment choices. 
They found that overconfidence increases with the absolute deviation from optimal choices 
and with task complexity. 
The investor’s behavior under market imperfection has been discussed in T. Besley (1994), 
J. Tirole (2006, 2011), K. Kirabaeva (2011). T. Besley (1994) studied market failure, 
emphasizing the need to consider the full array of constraints that combine to make a market 
work imperfectly. He discussed various reasons for market failure and considered the 
problems that may be cited as failures of the market justifying intervention (enforcement; 
imperfect information, especially adverse selection and moral hazard; the risk of bank runs 
and so on). T. Besley (1994) concluded that there may be good arguments for intervention, 
and some may be based on market failure. J. Tirole (2006) in his «Theory of Corporate 
Finance» introduced asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders at the financing 
stage. The presented models are based on model of adverse selection in capital allocation and 
on model of moral hazard in capital allocation. J. Tirole (2006) defined some limitation of 
model: absence of asymmetric information about investors; absence of informational 
advantages over issuers for investors and so on. J. Tirole (2011) provided analysis of market 
jumpstarting and its two-way interaction between mechanism design and participation 
constraints. He fined that the government can reduce adverse selection enough to let the 
market rebound, but not too much, so as to limit the cost of intervention. 
The behavioral theory touch on psychology, that’s why a number of researches combined 
psychological and economic aspects, related to investor’s behavior. 
P. Anand et al. (1993) explored the social and moral dimensions of investment via “non-
financial” dimensions of utility functions. They identified factors affecting investor’s' 
decision and they found that there are companies whose nature of business are unacceptable 
to investors due to moral issues. 
D. Kent et al. (2002) argued that limited attention and overconfidence cause investor credulity 
about the strategic incentives of informed market participants. G. Cassar& H. Friedman 
(2007) examined the affect of overconfidence on the entrepreneurial investment choices of 
individuals. They found that individual overconfidence is associated with more aggressive 
entrepreneurial investment decisions. 
One of the ways to investigate the interaction between investor and government is the game 
theory approach. 
J. Berg et al. (1995) were the first who introduced the notion of investment game in order to 
study trust and reciprocity in an investment setting. Their analysis included repeat game 
reputation effects, contractual recommitments and punishment threats. J. Berg et al. (1995) 
find that reciprocity exists as a basic element of human behavior and that is accounted for in 
the trust extended to anonymous counterpart. 
G. Coricelli et al. (2006) continued the investigation of «investment game» by introducing 
asymmetric information into the model. In their experiment, only the trustee knew the size of 
the surplus. They find that average payback levels increase with the average amount sent and 
asymmetric information does not reduce the amounts sent and returned. 
G. Charness et al. (2008) studied the effect of the possibility of third-party intervention on 
behavior in «investment game». They assumed that a third-party's material payoff is not 
affected by the decisions made by the other participants and that a third party may choose to 
reward a sender who has received a low net payoff as a result of the responder's action. For 
both punishment regimes they find a strong and significant effect of third-party punishment; 
at that third parties punish less when reward is feasible. 
K. Huisman (2001), K. Zhu & J. Weyant (2003), G.W. Greenwood & R. Tymerski (2008) 
applied the game theory to study decision-making process in various aspects of investment 
activity. A game theoretical approach used to incorporate strategic interactions in designing 
technology investment decision of an individual firm was considered in K. Huisman (2001). 
The technology investment decision under asymmetric information was studied by K. Zhu & 
J. Weyant (2003). G. W. Greenwood & R. Tymerski (2008) studied stock market investment 
as a zero-sum, competitive game with brokerage firms as players, which independently 
develop investment strategies which compete against each other in the marketplace. 
C. Özden& F. J. Parodi (2004), T. Funke& P. Klein using game theory tools estimated 
empirically the investment relations in various industries.C. Özden& F. J. Parodi (2004) 
studied the influence of regional trade agreements on FDI using a game-theoretical approach 
on Mercosur’s auto industry. They found that the compensated trade clause (although it is 
economically inefficient in regards of FDI flowing into the region) is strategically 
advantageous for the establishment of free trade in automobiles.T. Funke& P. Klein analyzed 
the biofuels industry in South Africa using game theoretic tools. They developed a model 
representing the rational strategies of various role players in the industry with respect to 
investor decision-making. 
Despite of a number of studies related to investor’s behavior in the process of his interaction 
with government (i.a. under market imperfections), covering the various aspects of investment 
activity, the issue of reduction of risks of investor’s activity in such interaction actually is 
under investigated.Sincewe’ll study the process of interaction between investors and 
government, itissuitabletomodelthatprocessby applying the gametheorymethods. 
3. Model of interaction between investors and government 
Let’s consider the strategic choices, which can be used by government – from one side, and 
investors – from another. 
Investor’s choice. Let’s consider two types of investors: the risk-loving and risk-averse 
investors.The process of earning of investment income is not well defined, and investor faces 
the choice: to secure himself and to devote some funds for improving reliability of own 
operating results or to risk, trying to maximize the profit due to cost minimization.From this 
perspective, the actions of risk-averse investor aimed to improve safety of operating results 
due to reduction of payoff (return) can be treat as satisfactory behavior. Conversely, the risk 
actions aimed to receive of maximum payoff can be treated as maximizing behavior. 
Government’s choice.The government also has two alternatives of behavior so-called 
«liberal»and«social». In a simplified form the social behavior can be treated as total 
investment «insurance» (similar to individual insurance, mentioned above), i.e. the improving 
of safety of doing business in country. The government spends some funds to improve safety, 
simultaneously increasing the taxes. 
Similarly, the liberal behavior features by minimization of expenses for improving of safety. 
As consequence, the additional component for “business insurance” in tax rate is absent. 
Sincethe decision-makingprocess concerning the financing of reduction of risk of investment 
activity can be presented as process of interaction between investors and government, 
itissuitabletomodelthatprocessusingagame-theoreticapproach. 
Let’s assume that expenses related to reduction of risks of own investment activity are made 
by investor additionally; they influence on amount of expected income by increasing it. At 
once, the amount of investment remains unchanged. The same additional expenses related to 
increase of profitability of investment activity are assumed for government in case of 
choosing the “social” strategy. 
As the model parameters, defining the cost of various strategies, the following basic economic 
indicators will be used: 
 the expected investor’s income (R, R>0); 
 the aggregatetaxburden (τ, τ>0); 
 θ – taxrateforgovernment’sassistancefor safety of investment activity (θ≥0); 
 λ,µ – government’sandinvestor’sexpensesrespectively aimed at reduction of risks of 
investment activity(λ≥0, µ≥0); 
 p0 – 
initialprobabilityofnonreceiptofexpectedincome(0≤p0≤1);thegeneralfunctionofprobability 
p of receiving insufficient income (proceeded from expenses ) 
 ingeneraltheprobabilitypof receiving insufficient income depends on amount of funds 
devoted to reduction of risks of investment activity. 
Thetypeofthisdependencecanbedeterminedbasedonitsbehavioralproperties: limited values, 
monotonicity. 
Obviously, the absence of expenses means that probability is on the p0 level; increasing 
expenses reduce p. It’s assumed that p reduces according with lawofdiminishingreturns. 
Also, it should be considered that probability at any amount of expenses cannot be less 
than zero. Therefore, the dependence function between income and investment will be 
monotone decreasing. Those considerations allow supposing that the determined 
dependence is exponential with negative value of index, which should consider the 
amount of expenses related to reduction of risks of investment activity (λ or µ). Also it is 
obvious that the same expenses will lead to greater outcomes for investors with humble 
income, i.e. λshould be R-scaled. Hence, we obtain the dependence of Re
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 α,β – coefficients of parameterization; 
At that rate, the model of principal-agent interaction can be described as game (1-5): 
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government does notspend to improve the safety of investment 
activity in country; gov1 is the “social” strategy, i.e. the government 
devotes some funds for improving the safety of investment activity, 
that provides the achievement of marginal utility; 
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marginal utility; 
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(5) 
  = investor’s payoff matrix.  
Thus, the game (1-5) describes the interaction between 2 agents: governmentand investor; 
each of them has 2 pure strategies of behavior. The variables of game are divided into the 
control parameters of government (τ, θ, λ), the control parameter of taxpayer (μ) and the 
parameters (and functions) of environment (R, p0, α,β). 
Analysisofgame (1-5) allowsdeterminingconditions, leadingtooneorother behavioral 
tendencies of government and investors. 
Let’s find the conditions of Nash equilibrium in pure strategiesrelative to: 
the amount of government’s and investor’s expenses related to reduction of risks of 
investment activity in the country (it is obvious that the expenses is non the absolute value, 
since they depend from measuring scale; for that reason we’ll use as indicator the non-
dimensional standardized value – the ratio of above mentioned expenses λandµ to 
investor’sprofitability R): 
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theinvestors’ profitabilitylevelincertaineconomicsystemandthetaxlevelinsuchsystem: 
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4. Results and Discussion 
Therefore, the analysis of interaction between investor and government using a game theory 
tools highlighted in their behavior the set of patterns, which can be suitably characterized for 
each interaction parameter separately. 
4.1. Power of investors (R) 
If we investigate the interaction between government and single investor, the parameter R will 
denote the amount of investment of such investor. However, at macro level when the 
government faces with aggregated investor (on other words, all investors together, operating 
in the economy of given country), R denotes the aggregate amount of investment in the 
economy as well, i.e. the capacity of country’s economy.Set of definitions of R is expressed 
by additional semiaxis. 
It can be seen from (10)-(13) that gradual increase of R leads to certain evolution of investor’s 
and government’s priorities. A relatively small economy with low powered investors requires 
the maximum liberalization both on the part of government, which does not desire to devote 
additional funds (or there are no such funds at all) for improving the safety of business 
activity and on the part of investors, who prefer to risk rather than to devote additional own 
funds for reduction of risks of own activity (Fig. 1). 
Fig. 1.ValuesofRandfor the Nash equilibriumE00 
 
Source: Data source – authorial calculation 
Surely, they can aim to get not only into liberal economy, but also into social one (depending 
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: «+» means the 
investor’s intention to get into social economy, «–»means the investor’s intention to get into 
liberal economy. However, beginningwithcertainvalueof “socialization” coefficientλ, the 
devoting funds to improving the safety of business activity becomes unprofitable for 
government; and it either curtail this process and shifts to liberal strategy or by some means 
tries to dispose of low powered investors. 
Conversely, the more powerful are the investors, the more efforts they make to reduce risks of 
own activity regardless the level of liberality of government policy. Formally, investors 
change their risk-loving behavior on risk-averse one when their profitability increase 
insomuch that ratio µbecomes fewer than   01 1R Rp e e
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Concerning the government’s behavior one can observe the similar situation as for low 
powered investors discussed above: beginningwithcertainvalueofλ, the devoting funds to 
improving the safety of business activity in jurisdiction becomes unprofitable for government. 
Although it may be caused by other reason: for example, the investors’ effort necessary to 
secure their own activity, virtually, set the ratio “expenses – safety of activity” on the level of 
marginal utility. Therefore, the additional government expenditures in that process are 
unprofitable (Fig. 2). 
Fig. 2. Values of Randfor the Nash equilibriumE11 
 
Source: Data source – authorial calculation 
Generally in can be concluded that the vector of evolution of interaction between investors 
and government is directed from mutual strategy of reciprocal absence of financing of safety 
of investment activity till maximum possible financing, realizing both by every investor (with 
regard to its own activity) and by government (with regard to all investment activity in the 
economy). Let’s call this vector as “policy of mutual support” or “bilateral behavior”. 
4.2.Total tax burden (τ) 
Our study investigates the tax level τ on macro level that can be described either as the 
major“budget-generating” tax or as the most important tax for corporations (not for 
individuals, since we consider the investment activity as the activity of corporations), for 
example the corporate income tax. But the most reasonably, to our mind, is to consider τ as 
aggregate tax burden on corporations. Obviously, the set of determinations for τis closed 
interval[0; 1]. 
The aggregate investor’sand government’s behavior,as well as for case for R, can be 
determined from analysis of (10)-(13). But as opposed to case for R, the interaction between 
investors and government evolves from financing of safety of investment activity (due to 
liberal government strategy) by each investor independently towards the government social 
strategy, in consequence of which investors curtail their individual expenses, entirely relying 
on centrally-controlled measures. 
I.e. the small tax burden permits to investors to devote some funds for improving the safety of 
their own business. Another factor, favoring to financing of safety, is the relatively large 
after-tax profit, and thus the larger efficiency of financing of own safety. Because of the same 
reason related to smaller tax revenues, it is unprofitably for government to devote additional 
funds for reduction of risks of investor’s activity (Fig. 3). 
Fig. 3. Values of Randfor the Nash equilibrium E01 
 
Source: Data source – authorial calculation 
The gradual increase of τ leads to changes in government’s and investors’ behavior. Finally, 
the high tax level and, thus the high tax revenues, make the additional financing of safety of 
investors’ activity economically advantageous for government. However, the amount of 
unallocated funds of investors (who in this case pay heavy general taxes, and also the 
additional tax for improving the safety of business activity) reduces considerably. Therefore, 
the investors tend to rely on government’s activity and in addition do not reduce the risk of 
own activity individually (Fig. 4). 
Fig. 4. Values of Randfor the Nash equilibriumE10 
 
Source: Datasource – authorialcalculation 
Such evolution can be called as “policy of complement” or “compensatory behavior”. 
This situation seems not quite logical: it can be assumed that developed countries with large 
volume of investments can increase the degree of liberalization of their economies and reduce 
the tax burden for the purpose of creating the favorable conditions for attracting investment. 
Also it is no wonder that powered investors, capable to secure independently the reduction of 
risk of their own activity, would tend to operate in economies with small tax burden that 
would allow increasing of their profit. 
Conversely, the government policy, consisting in centrally-controlled reduction of risks of 
investment activity though with simultaneous increasing of tax burden, could attract the small 
investors who have no additional funds to secure independently the safety of own activity. 
I.e. finally, it will be naturally when the most powerful and investment-attractive economies 
would use the more liberal tax system by contrast to developing and LDC countries, the 
investment activity in whose is accompanied by high risk. 
But statistical data demonstrates us another state of things, confirming conclusions, obtained 
in the process of model analysis. The direct statistical relationship between size of economies 
and the level of tax burden is rather obvious. Table 1 demonstrates the rates of corporate 
income tax, amounts of GDP and total investment for 2011 in OECD countries (except 
forIreland, Island, Israel and Mexico). The correlation coefficient between corporate income 
tax and GDP is 0,65; the correlation coefficient between corporate income tax and total 
investment is 0,69. 
 
Tab. 1: Rates of corporate income tax, amounts of GDP and total investment in 
OECD countries for 2011 
Country СIT, % 
GDP,  
$ billions 
Total investment,  
$ millions 
Australia 30,00 1486,914 404,277 
Austria 25,00 418,414 97,097 
Belgium 33,99 514,593 111,991 
United Kingdom 28,00 2431,310 359,396 
Hungary 19,00 140,303 26,761 
Germany 29,37 3607,364 658,849 
Greece 20,00 299,275 43,494 
Denmark 25,00 332,019 57,967 
Spain 30,00 1479,560 318,712 
Italy 31,40 140,303 26,761 
Canada 28,30 1738,954 396,255 
Korea 24,20 1116,247 328,735 
Luxembourg 28,80 59,582 12,317 
Netherlands 25,00 838,112 151,539 
New Zealand 30,00 158,869 29,844 
Norway 28,00 485,404 112,531 
Poland 19,00 514,503 111,765 
Portugal 25,00 237,831 41,532 
Slovak Republic 19,00 96,089 21,092 
Slovenia 20,00 50,330 10,130 
United States 40,00 15075,675 2335,071 
Turkey 20,00 774,336 184,447 
Finland 26,00 263,488 54,924 
France 33,33 2778,085 573,397 
Czech Republic 19,00 215,180 52,799 
Chile 20,00 248,431 61,238 
Switzerland 21,17 660,761 137,128 
Sweden 26,30 544,681 103,037 
Estonia 21,00 22,205 5,447 
Japan 40,69 5866,540 1165,623 
Source: Datasource (IMFWorld Economic Outlook Database, October 2012;SokolovskaO. (2012)) 
Fig. 5 demonstrates the graphical interpretation of above mentioned correlation. It can be seen 
that economies with large GDP have the high corporate income tax; on the other side, 
economies with high corporate income tax have the largest investment. 
 
Fig. 5.Dependence between CIT, GDP&Totalinvestment 
  
a) dependence between CIT and GDP b) dependence between CIT and Total 
investment 
Source: Datasource – authorialcalculation 
I.e. it can be stated that in practice the powered investors tend to operate in secured – “social” 
economies, and the low powered investors, primarily, are accordant to operate in economic 
systems with maximum liberalization, but also with minimum tax burden. 
Finally, such behavior can (comparing with other conditions, for example, the equal 
distribution of investors in economic systems) increase the risk of bankruptcy for most of 
small investors; the powered corporations would not use their capacities to the full extent due 
to excessive precaution. I.e. given norm of interaction will lead to Pareto non-optimal 
decision that allows identifying it as inefficient. 
5. Conclusion 
One of the important questions related to interaction between investors and government 
within certain economy is the decision-making by both parties concerning the financing of 
improving the safety of investment activity. 
The analysis of relations between the parties by applying the game model permits to affirm 
that decisions, made by parties often leads to formation of Pareto inefficient norms of mutual 
behavior, especially for the smallest and the biggest investors. Those Pareto inefficient norms 
are that both investors and government simultaneously tend either to finance or to not finance 
the improving of safety of investment activity. 
One of the consequences of that situation is the high tax burden in powerful economies, i.e. 
economies with high GDP (but not necessarily in the developed countries) where the bulk of 
investment flows into those economies, in despite of high taxes. The analysis of statistical 
data of OECD countries generally confirms this conclusion, especially with regard to the 
biggest investors. 
The directions of future research of investigated problem are related with modeling of 
structures and categories of institutional economics: norms, institutes, routines, contracts etc., 
aimed to avoid forming of ineffective norms, and also to reform 
The determination of factors, influencing on forming norms of mutual investors’ and 
government’s behavior will encourage the development and realization of specific 
management decisions, aimed to avoid and to remedy such situation. This could lead to more 
rational allocation of available funds by investors and government, and consequently to more 
profitable investment activity. 
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The problem of arising the Pareto inefficient norm in relations 
“investor – government” type 
Summary 
The article deals with problem of forming of Pareto non-optimal norms of mutual behavior of 
investorsandgovernment in the process of decision-making related to financing of reduction 
of risks of investment activity in economy. 
The game-theoretical analysis suggests that inefficiency of arising norms is non-casual; it 
follows from the behavior of interactive parties. 
Empirical verification based on statistical data of OECD countries confirms in general the 
established conclusion. 
Key words: investors, government, economic behavior; game theory, Nash equilibrium, 
Pareto-optimality 
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